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After the Gold Rush: The Boom of the 
Internet of Things, and the Busts of 
Data-Security and Privacy 
Dalmacio V. Posadas, Jr.* 
This Article addresses the impact that the lack of oversight of 
the Internet of Things has on digital privacy. While the Internet of 
Things is but one vehicle for technological innovation, it has 
created a broad glimpse into domestic life, thus triggering several 
privacy issues that the law is attempting to keep pace with. What 
the Internet of Things can reveal is beyond the control of the 
individual, as it collects information about every practical aspect 
of an individual’s life, and provides essentially unfettered access 
into the mind of its users. This Article proposes that the federal 
government and the state governments bend toward consumer 
protection while creating a cogent and predictable body of law 
surrounding the Internet of Things. Through privacy-by-design or 
self-help, it is imperative that the Internet of Things—and any of its 
unforeseen progeny—develop with an eye toward safeguarding 
individual privacy while allowing technological development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Because, you know, resilience—if you think of it 
in terms of the Gold Rush, then you’d be pretty 
depressed right now because the last nugget of gold 
would be gone. But the good thing is, with 
innovation, there isn’t a last nugget. Every new 
thing creates two new questions and two new 
opportunities.” – Jeff Bezos1 
In 1969, in an attempt to send the first electronic transmission 
through an early-model computer, University of California, Los 
Angeles students attempted to type in the word “login” but the 
computer crashed after typing in the second letter.2 Tim Berners-
Lee would soon after develop what we know today as the Internet.3 
Less than fifty years later, electronic transmissions are capable of 
complex and high-speed communication. Amidst the development 
of the Internet, the legal system has attempted to keep pace with 
the ever-growing and dynamic nature of the technological boom. 
All things Internet and electronic have provided a boon to society 
while also complicating related legal issues. In the relatively short 
life of the Internet, the legal system has attempted to adapt and 
address new privacy concerns such as: personal computers in the 
1980s; the Internet in the 1990s; mobile apps at the beginning of 
the 2000s; and currently, the Internet of Things (“IoT”),4 with 
                                                                                                             
1 Jeff Bezos, Founder & CEO, Amazon.com, Address at the TED2003 Conference: 
The Electricity Metaphor for the Web’s Future (Feb. 2003), https://www.ted.com/talks
/jeff_bezos_on_the_next_web_innovation/transcript?language=en 
[https://perma.cc/CG2W-NN6Y]. 
2 See Daily Mail Reporter, Pictured: The Fridge-Sized Computer that Sent the Very 
First Email [Fourty] Years Ago . . . But Crashed After Just Two Letters Were Received, 
DAILY MAIL (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1224100
/Internets-40th-birthday-First-email-crashes-just-letters.html  
[https://perma.cc/SQ2K-H4RG]. 
3 See TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE 
DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR 2–3 (1999). 
4 See Stephen Lawson, Look Before You Leap: [Four] Hard Truths About IoT, 
PCWORLD (Mar. 23, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/3184327/internet-
of-things/look-before-you-leap-4-hard-truths-about-iot.html [https://perma.cc/QBK5-
UL2M]; see also Maureen Dowd, Elon Musk’s Billion-Dollar Crusade to Stop the A.I. 
Apocalypse, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 2017), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/03/elon-
musk-billion-dollar-crusade-to-stop-ai-space-x?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium
=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosam [https://perma.cc/4K82-2RLX] (“‘Your 
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artificial intelligence (“AI”) hot on its heels.5 Nevertheless, as 
technology evolves into the vast and unknown, IoT, data-security, 
and privacy issues remain. And in the IoT, these privacy issues are 
exacerbated because of the blurred lines between digital and 
physical infrastructures.6 
What the IoT can reveal is beyond the control of the individual, 
as it collects information about every practical aspect of an 
individual’s life, and provides essentially unfettered access into the 
mind of its user.7 In their seminal work on privacy, Samuel Warren 
and Justice Brandeis determined that the right to privacy was the 
“right to be let alone.”8 The right to privacy was essentially the 
right to control your own personal information.9 In a recent survey 
                                                                                                             
phone and your computer are extensions of you, but the interface is through finger 
movements or speech, which are very slow.’ With a neural lace inside your skull you 
would flash data from your brain, wirelessly, to your digital devices or to virtually 
unlimited computing power in the cloud. ‘For a meaningful partial-brain interface, I think 
we’re roughly four or five years away.’” (quoting Elon Musk CEO and founder of 
SpaceX, CEO and co-founder of Tesla, CEO and founder of Neuralink, and co-Chairman 
of OpenAI)). Perhaps in the near future AI will guide the digital privacy debate. 
5 See Joseph Jerome, Why Artificial Intelligence May Be the Next Big Privacy Trend, 
IAPP (Oct. 10, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/why-artificial-intelligence-may-be-the-
next-big-privacy-trend/ [https://perma.cc/5TUB-D6TU]. 
6 See Lawson, supra note 4 (“[A] Technalysis survey last year found operations 
departments were in charge of IoT projects more often than IT shops.”  
(citation omitted)). 
7 Despite Chief Justice Roberts’s sardonic riff on the state of legal scholarship, Kant 
may be an appropriate—if not highly relevant—entry point for this area of law. See A 
Conversation with Chief Justice John Roberts (C-SPAN television broadcast June 25, 
2011), https://www.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts 
[https://perma.cc/XQ3X-EH5X] (“Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the 
first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary 
approaches in eighteenth-century Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was of great 
interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the bar.”); see also 
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 17–21 (F. Max Müller trans., 2d ed. Rev. 
1922) (explaining that the mind structures experiences of reality, while the rules dictating 
reality are intrinsic to the mind and, accordingly, if these rules are identified then reality 
can be decoded). 
8 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 193, 195, 201 (1890). Their analysis could not foresee the intrusiveness of 
technological devices that would pervade contemporary society. Had they done so, then 
perhaps they would have placed a premium on the intellectual activities ultimately at the 
center of what is to be protected, rather than the act of intrusion itself that society would 
not accept as reasonable. 
9 See id. 
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by the Pew Research Center, ninety-three percent of adults said 
that being in control of who can get their information is important, 
while ninety percent said that controlling what information is 
collected about them is also important.10 Nevertheless, billions of 
people willingly hand over their personal information every day 
without understanding the effects that this may have on their  
own privacy.11 
This Article addresses the impact of the lack of oversight over 
the IoT, and the data-security and privacy issues that the IoT 
implicates. Part I provides a brief background of and defines the 
IoT, and discusses its interaction with data collection. Part II 
explains the current state of IoT privacy regulations under the 
federal framework, along with a discussion of California’s lead on 
data privacy issues. Additionally, Part II briefly discusses a few 
successful attempts by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to 
hold IoT developers accountable for security breaches. Part III 
discusses recent data-security issues and potential future harms to 
privacy in the IoT. In particular, this Part discusses recent IoT 
devices that have been hacked and the resulting injuries. Part IV 
discusses data-breach notifications, and the need for the FTC to—
at minimum—include a privacy-by-design aspect in overseeing 
IoT devices. This Part also discusses self-help methods that 
consumers may apply to protect their data and privacy, and the 
potential impact that self-help might have on federal regulations. 
I. A HISTORY OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
The IoT is composed of mostly unsecure devices, which 
provide a wellspring of information about its users.12 This Part 
                                                                                                             
10 Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and 
Surveillance, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 20, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015
/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-surveillance/ 
[https://perma.cc/M75G-ADT9]. 
11 See, e.g., Ben Popper & Nikki Erlick, Facebook Is Closing in on [Two] Billion 
Monthly Users, VERGE (Feb. 1, 2017, 4:14 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2017/2/1
/14474534/facebook-earnings-q4-fourth-quarter-2016 [https://perma.cc/E7TU-6FER]. 
12 See Lucian Constantin, IoT Malware Starts Showing Destructive Behavior, 
PCWORLD (Apr. 7, 2017, 11:37 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/3188484/security
/iot-malware-starts-showing-destructive-behavior.html [https://perma.cc/B4R7-8HUF]. 
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provides a brief background of the IoT, defines some of its 
pertinent characteristics, and raises key issues on how the IoT 
relates to data collection and privacy. 
A. A Brief Background on the IoT 
Technologist Kevin Ashton claimed he coined the term “the 
Internet of Things” in 1999 during a presentation to Proctor and 
Gamble, in which he stated that adding radio-frequency 
identification (“RFID”) and other sensors to everyday objects will 
lay the foundation of a new age of machine perception, creating an 
Internet of Things.13 At the time, it seems that Ashton was 
primarily discussing the use of RFIDs in an industrial setting, since 
the idea of a networked manufacturing process dates back to the 
1980s.14 The development and ubiquity of RFIDs precipitated the 
growth of a larger growing body of interconnected devices for 
consumer use, where all devices are now becoming linked within a 
network.15 Thus, “[w]hat makes the IoT dynamic is the ability to 
control products, machines and systems over the internet.”16 
It appears that the digital revolution has come full-circle. The 
IoT is not only a new realm unto itself; it also affects how the 
                                                                                                             
13 See Kevin Ashton, That ‘Internet of Things’ Thing, RFID J. (June 22, 2009), 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986 [https://perma.cc/JFP6-83SV]; see also 
CLARITY INNOVATIONS, INTERNET OF THINGS 5 (2016), https://www.clarity-innovations
.com/sites/default/files/publications/clarity-iot-in-education.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/9ETV-M5CF]. 
14 See A Sea of Sensors, ECONOMIST (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node
/17388356 [https://perma.cc/6DPU-384T] (“The concept of the ‘internet of things’ dates 
back to the late 1980s, when researchers at Palo Alto Research Centre (PARC) in Silicon 
Valley imagined a future in which the virtual and the real world would be connected.”); 
see also, e.g., Lars S. Smith, RFID and Other Embedded Technologies: Who Owns the 
Data?, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 695, 695–96 (2006) (discussing 
RFID’s application to managing commercial inventory and manufacturing). 
15 See, e.g., Alexandre Santos et al., Internet of Things and Smart Objects for M-
Health Monitoring and Control, 16 PROCEDIA TECH. 1351, 1352 (2014) (“RFID[] is used 
in many applications . . . . There are several methods of identification, although the most 
common is a microchip able to store a serial number that identifies the person, object or 
thing. Using electronic devices that emit radio frequency signals, it is possible to perform 
an automatic capture of data, or a tag, from a reader.”). 
16 H. Michael O’Brien, The Impact of the Smart Home Revolution on Product Liability 
and Fire Cause Determinations, WILSON ELSER (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www
.wilsonelser.com/writable/files/Client_Alerts/product_liability_fire_science_.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y3DH-LR6L]. 
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Internet works.17 The Internet was once only comprised of codes in 
the abstract—ephemerally stored in the cloud.18 However, the 
Internet has now manifested itself into the physical world in the 
form of networked objects also known as the IoT.19 Courts and 
legislators are failing to address the appropriate level of oversight 
of developing technologies with privacy implications, such as IoT 
devices entering the market. Notably, this Article does not focus on 
one single device, and generally discusses the privacy issues that 
the IoT creates. 
B. The IoT Defined 
At its most basic definition, the IoT is simply objects with 
sensors networked together that are capable of communicating 
with one another.20 The IoT is synonymous with smart cities, 
driverless cars, and all other forms of interconnected objects and 
wearables.21 Born of innovation, these networked objects have 
                                                                                                             
17 Pierre DeBois, How the Internet of Things is Reshaping Search, CMS WIRE (Mar. 
20, 2017), http://www.cmswire.com/digital-experience/how-the-internet-of-things-is-
reshaping-search/ [https://perma.cc/2KJP-CNFZ] (“The quality of queries from 
IoTQR”—which is defined as the “search results based on the query phrases consumers 
say to a smart device”—“differs significantly from a search engine results page (SERP), 
making marketers reconsider how digital media should align to query phrases as well as 
with online search patterns of keywords.”). 
18 See David Delony, The [Five] Programming Languages that Built the Internet, 
TECHOPEDIA (Oct. 3, 2014), https://www.techopedia.com/2/25666/internet/the-6-
programming-languages-that-built-the-internet [https://perma.cc/5456-X55R] (explaining 
how the Internet was built on coding languages). See generally Steve Johnson, What is 
Digital Coding?, TECHWALLA, https://www.techwalla.com/articles/what-is-digital-coding 
[https://perma.cc/A9S2-YUVR] (last visited Aug. 24, 2017) (discussing the basics of 
digital coding and the binary system of zeros and ones that comprise the fundamental 
language of digital information). 
19 Luigi Atzori et al., The Internet of Things: A Survey, 54 COMPUTER 
NETWORKS 2787, 2787 (2010) (“The basic idea of this concept is the pervasive presence 
around us of a variety of things or objects—such as . . . RFID tags, sensors, actuators, 
mobile phones, etc.—which, through unique addressing schemes, are able to interact with 
each other and cooperate with their neighbors to reach common goals.”); see also Jacob 
Morgan, A Simple Explanation of the ‘Internet of Things,’ FORBES (May 13, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-
things-that-anyone-can-understand/#1910b3fb1d09 [https://perma.cc/3DK2-W3RA] 
(providing a visual aid to illustrate the interconnectivity of the IoT). 
20 See Atzori et al., supra note 19. 
21 See Jason Tanz, The CIA Leak Exposes Tech’s Vulnerable Future, WIRED (Mar. 8, 
2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/cia-leak-exposes-techs-vulnerable-
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developed to improve the lives of their users.22 Additionally, the 
technology provides for a real-time application of data processing, 
data storage, and data analysis.23 These objects gather and collect 
data, for example, in order to remind you that it is time to take your 
pills.24 On a larger scale, the so-called Industrial IoT is 
streamlining industrial production across the world.25 However, 
what remains unclear is the depth and breadth of how these 
efficient objects will impact privacy.26 
In order to anticipate the IoT’s impact on daily life, a basic 
understanding of its mechanics is necessary. IoT devices share data 
using familiar network protocols such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, mobile 
phone networks, and specialized networks—as well as the global 
Internet.27 IoT devices are embedded with RFIDs in order to share 
                                                                                                             
future/ [https://perma.cc/XVV2-NMZX] (“Whether you call it the ‘Internet of Things’ or 
the ‘Internet of Everything’ or the ‘Third Wave’ or the ‘Programmable World,’ the long-
predicted moment when connectivity becomes as ubiquitous as electricity is nearly  
upon us.”). 
22 Paul Kominers, Interoperability Case Study: Internet of Things (IoT), BERKMAN 
CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y 3 (2012), https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/node/97248 
[https://perma.cc/92EV-U5QE] (“The grand vision of the [IoT] is a world of networked 
intelligent objects. Every car, refrigerator, and carton of milk would be distinguished with 
its RFID chip, and they communicate constantly and seamlessly to create a much more 
efficient world.”). 
23 See Leon Hounshell, Forecasting Profitable Models for the Internet of Things, 
FORBES (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/03/23
/forecasting-profitable-models-for-the-internet-of-things/#1f2d5cf33e94 
[https://perma.cc/52AW-J32S]. 
24 See DAVID ROSE, ENCHANTED OBJECTS: DESIGN, HUMAN DESIRE, AND THE INTERNET 
OF THINGS 8–9 (2014) (discussing a pill bottle called a GlowCap that syncs to the Internet 
to remind patients to take their pills). 
25 See Kipp Bradford, The Industrial Internet of Things, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2014, 8:00 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/oreillymedia/2014/02/05/the-industrial-internet-of-
things/#7da766581c39 [https://perma.cc/DXM7-C9YX]. 
26 See generally RICHARD RUTLEDGE ET AL., GA. INST. OF TECH., DEFINING THE 
INTERNET OF DEVICES: PRIVACY AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS (2014), https://smartech
.gatech.edu/bitstream/handle/1853/52020/plsc2014-IoD.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/76TX-Y246]. 
27 See Ian Brown, GSR Discussion Paper: Regulation and the Internet of Things 3, 6 
(June 25, 2015) (working paper) (on file with International Telecommunication Union), 
https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Conferences/GSR/Documents/GSR2015/Discussion
_papers_and_Presentations/GSR_DiscussionPaper_IoT.pdf [https://perma.cc/558E-
MFMS] (“Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication is used to refer to 
communication directly between IoT devices, often via cellular networks.”). 
2017]   AFTER THE GOLDRUSH 77 
 
data.28 RFIDs are then connected to networked objects such as 
“parking meters, thermostats, cardiac monitors, tires, roads, car 
components, to supermarket shelves and many other types of 
physical object.”29 RFIDs are also being connected to what most 
would already consider a private object.30 Driverless cars are 
quickly being developed with complex sensors that track and 
analyze a user’s driving habits.31 There are already plans to 
connect smartphones to parking grids in order to make parking 
efficient while maximizing public spaces.32 In short, the IoT  
has arrived. 
Unfortunately, many IoT devices are hastily put on the market 
and are not engineered to protect data security.33 IoT developers 
are rushing their devices to market before properly ensuring that 
their devices are stable and secure.34 Particularly, consumer-goods 
manufacturers—not computer software or hardware firms—often 
                                                                                                             
28 See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 31–35 (2010) (discussing two types of RFIDS, active and 
passive—active RFIDs are internally powered, and can communicate over longer 
distances and up to one thousand meters while travelling at upwards of one hundred miles 
per hour, whereas a passive RFID is not internally powered and is only engaged when a 
reader is close in enough in proximity). 
29 Brown, supra note 27, at 3. 
30 See John Kennedy, Intimate of Things: Smart Vibrator Gets Hacked at Def Con 24, 
SILICON REPUBLIC (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.siliconrepublic.com/machines/smart-
vibrator-hacked-def-con-24 [https://perma.cc/5F36-3EQC] 
(discussing a very private, if not very intimate, interconnected object named the “We-
Vibe,” a sex toy that is able to send information about its users, like the temperature of 
the device, each time a user changes intensity levels on the device). 
31 See Mike Ramsey, On the Road to Driverless Cars, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2017, 2:52 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gartnergroup/2017/01/26/on-the-road-to-driverless-
cars/#5d5c1b8617ed [https://perma.cc/QX76-VUFH]. 
32 See, M. Ramya et al., Parking Slot Availability Check and Booking System over IOT, 
1 ASIAN J. APPLIED SCI. & TECH. 149, 149–52 (2017) (discussing their design to improve 
and implement “Wi-Fi based smart car parking services in modern cities” to maximize 
public space and reduce waiting time). 
33 See Alisa Valudes Whyte, Trending from CES: IoT Companies Avoiding Security 
Are Putting Their Survival at Stake, HUFFPOST (Jan. 25, 2017, 8:53 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trending-from-ces-iot-companies-avoiding-
security_us_5888a8e2e4b04251e621fa88 [https://perma.cc/4ARX-DGY8]. 
34 See Thibaut Rouffineau, Three Flaws at the Heart of IoT Security, UBUNTU 
INSIGHTS (Mar. 20, 2017), https://insights.ubuntu.com/2017/03/20/three-flaws-at-the-
heart-of-iot-security/ [https://perma.cc/8GAY-ZEQT]. 
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manufacture many IoT devices.35 With little IoT developer 
oversight, and eroding federal regulations before they have even 
been established,36 it is no wonder that the largest distributed 
denial of service attack (“DDoS”) in history was perpetrated 
through a series of IoT devices.37 A DDoS is a form of extortion by 
hackers, whereby a server is flooded with artificial traffic, bringing 
services to a screeching halt.38 Accordingly, the IoT’s rush to 
market and inherently flawed security poses several hazards to 
data-security and privacy.39 
C. The IoT and Data Collection 
In their seminal work on privacy, Samuel Warren and Justice 
Brandeis characterized an individual’s privacy interest as the “right 
to be let alone,”40 and defined this fundamental right in the context 
of “[r]ecent inventions” that threatened privacy.41 “Recent 
inventions” such as the IoT, are potentially more pernicious and 
devastating to an individual’s “right to be let alone,”42 primarily 
because of the depth and breadth of information that IoT devices 
gather and analyze. 
                                                                                                             
35 Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 94 (2014). 
36 See, e.g., S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (disapproving 81 Fed. Reg. 87,274  
(Dec. 2, 2016)). 
37 See Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Are DoS and DDoS Attacks?, WIRED (Jan. 
16, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/hacker-lexicon-what-are-dos-and-
ddos-attacks/ [https://perma.cc/2JYU-W934] (discussing DDoS attacks); see also, e.g., 
Lily Hay Newman, What We Know About Friday’s Massive East Coast Internet Outage, 
WIRED (Oct. 21, 2016, 1:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/internet-outage-ddos-
dns-dyn/ [https://perma.cc/6LKM-X2GT]; infra Part III for an in-depth discussion of a 
recent DDoS attack through IoT devices. 
38 See Zetter, supra note 37. 
39 See Tom Pageler, Is Everything Hackable in the Internet of Things?, FORBES (Apr. 
5, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/04/05/is-
everything-hackable-in-the-internet-of-things/#4bab849e3084 [https://perma.cc/WPS5-
96HR] (discussing the lack of basic security controls for IoT devices). 
40 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 193, 195. 
41 Id. at 195–96 (explaining that particularly threatening to privacy were the then new 
“business methods” whereby gossip had “become a trade”). 
42 See id. at 205 (“The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal 
productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any 
form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an  
inviolate personality.”). 
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These IoT devices are engaging in “machine learning,” by 
quickly identifying patterns as IoT users engage with the devices.43 
And even though consumers may not be aware, many of the 
devices already in use—and not necessarily associated with the 
IoT—are in fact capable of being tracked through unique 
identifiers embedded in devices such as cellphones.44 By design, it 
appears that the IoT is bound to be a complex system of 
surveillance.45 For example, “[i]f the information stored on an 
RFID-tagged consumer item is unique to the particular item, it can 
be used to distinguish the person carrying the item from all other 
persons and thus be used to track the person carrying the RFID-
tagged item.”46 
Some scholars are skeptical of the blind-charge toward 
unfettered data collection.47 Professor Neil M. Richards suggests, 
“Big Data is notable not just because of the amount of personal 
information that can be processed, but because of the ways data in 
one area can be linked to other areas and analyzed to produce new 
inferences and findings.”48 Nevertheless, scholars can agree that 
one problem is not necessarily the accuracy of the data collected, 
                                                                                                             
43 See PHILLIP N. HOWARD, PAX TECHNICA: HOW THE INTERNET OF THINGS MAY SET US 
FREE OR LOCK US UP 141 (2015) (defining machine learning as the process of how 
categories emerge from the data sets, rather than the old way of interpreting statistical 
data, which involved a hypothesis that was tested and crudely based on intuitive labels of 
factors thought to be effective to infer questions). 
44 See Gus Hosein & Caroline Wilson Palow, Modern Safeguards for Modern 
Surveillance: An Analysis of Innovations in Communications Surveillance Techniques, 
74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1071, 1099 (2013); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII 
Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1814, 1837 (2011). 
45 See Nancy J. King, When Mobile Phones Are RFID-Equipped—Finding E.U.-U.S. 
Solutions to Protect Consumer Privacy and Facilitate Mobile Commerce, 15 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 107, 143–44 (2008) (discussing unique identifiers attributed 
to individual devices that create a system of surveillance). 
46 Id. at 143. 
47 See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Response, The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 339, 345 (2013), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-
Online-339.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q6V-7LCP] (urging caution in overestimating the 
benefits of Big Data, relative to the potential harms). 
48 Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1939 
(2013) (providing a more in-depth discussion and analysis of Big Data, which is defined 
as large volumes of structured or unstructured data that organizations can potentially 
mine and analyze). 
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but the accuracy of the inferences drawn based upon the Big Data 
collected.49 Professor Ryan Calo has even gone as far as to suggest 
that the aggregation and concentration of such private individual 
data could lead to what he calls “digital market manipulation.”50 
“Digital market manipulation” could allow firms to “increasingly 
be able to trigger irrationality or vulnerability in consumers—
leading to actual and perceived harms that challenge the limits of 
consumer protection law . . . which regulators can scarcely 
ignore.”51 Notwithstanding scholarly interpretation of the Big Data 
conundrum, immense data gathering and data storage is a source of 
collective anxiety.52 
A major concern with Big Data regarding the IoT’s privacy 
implications is that an individual’s private information could be 
used to predict future behavior after it is aggregated and 
analyzed.53 For example, “[s]ensor data capture incredibly rich 
nuance[s] about who we are, how we behave, what our tastes are, 
and even our intentions. Once filtered through ‘Big Data’ 
analytics, these data are the grist for drawing revealing and often 
unexpected inferences about our habits, predilections, and 
personalities.”54 Nevertheless, even with the growing concern over 
the IoT’s impact on privacy, the Acting Chairman of the FTC, 
Maureen Ohlhausen, is pushing for IoT providers to self-regulate 
as part of the Trump administration’s move toward complete 
deregulation.55 In fact, the push toward deregulation has already 
                                                                                                             
49 See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in 
the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 270–71 (2013) (“Inaccurate, 
manipulative, or discriminatory conclusions may be drawn from perfectly innocuous, 
accurate data.”). 
50 Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 999 (2014). 
51 Id. 
52 See Quentin Hardy, Rethinking Privacy in an Era of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 
2012, 9:55 AM), http:// bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/04/rethinking-privacy-in-an-era-
of-big-data [https://perma.cc/AH3R-97V7] (“Privacy is a source of tremendous tension 
and anxiety in Big Data . . . . It’s a general anxiety that you can’t pinpoint, this odd 
moment of creepiness.”). 
53 See Peppet, supra note 35, at 90. 
54 Id. 
55 See Sam Thielman, Acting Federal Trade Commission Head: Internet of Things 
Should Self-Regulate, GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian
.com/technology/2017/mar/14/federal-trade-commission-internet-things-regulation 
[https://perma.cc/97LV-XFPN]. 
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begun.56 Based on the current state of the regulatory framework 
governing data-security and digital privacy, allowing 
manufacturers to self-regulate as the IoT develops could harm 
consumers and the IoT technology.57 Accordingly, further 
deregulation, along with consumers failing to secure their 
information, could lead to a catastrophic breakdown in data 
security and privacy protections. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF IOT REGULATIONS ON DATA-
SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
Our current privacy laws are collected in federal and state 
legislation; administrative agencies; and common-law actions in 
tort, property, and contract law.58 This Part discusses federal and 
California regulations that govern digital privacy and security with 
respect to their impact on the IoT. Alarmingly, the trend toward 
deregulation is already taking hold. 
Although consumers may have remedies in tort59 or contract 
law,60 these remedies may not provide proper relief.61 For example, 
“[t]he current U.S. legal framework for cybersecurity is a 
                                                                                                             
56 See infra Part II. 
57 See Gareth Corfield, [U.S.] Regulator Looks at Internet of Things Regulation, Looks 
Away, REGISTER (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/14/us
_ftc_wont_start_internet_of_things_regulation/ [https://perma.cc/7S3L-DEEK]. 
58 See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 70–88 (Univ. N.C. Press  
1st ed. 1995). 
59 See Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing 
Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 6, 
102 (2015) (predicting that “[i]t would not be surprising to see future privacy-related 
controversies give rise to more legal actions involving the tort of intrusion upon 
seclusion”); Alexander H. Tran, Note, The Internet of Things and Potential Remedies in 
Privacy Tort Law, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 263, 279–80 (2017) (arguing that 
public disclosure of private facts and intrusion upon seclusion might be adequate tort 
claims for IoT-related harms). 
60 See Stacy-Ann Elvey, Hybrid Transactions and the Internet of Things: Goods, 
Services, or Software?, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77, 158 (2017) (providing a thorough 
analysis of IoT’s possible breach of warranty claims—for instance, some IoT devices 
sold to consumers contain hidden data monitoring features that are beyond the device’s 
ordinary purpose, thus giving rise to a breach of warranty claim). 
61 Cf. Kevin L. Miller, What We Talk About When We Talk About “Reasonable 
Cybersecurity”: A Proactive and Adaptive Approach, 90 FLA. B.J. 23, 23  
(Sept.–Oct. 2016). 
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patchwork, consisting of a number of overlapping federal 
standards aimed at regulated entities in various sectors, state cyber-
breach notification laws, state statutes, and caselaw arising from 
consumer’s actions against companies.”62 Further, in federal 
courts, privacy claims in tort law must meet the requirements for 
Article III standing.63 Additionally, if IoT related privacy issues 
were resolved under a tort theory like traditional privacy claims, 
the courts would be flooded with innumerable claims against IoT 
developers. And although a potential deluge of litigation might 
correct the current lackluster focus on security in the developing 
IoT market, it could take decades for such claims to travel through 
the state courts before developing into a cogent and predictable 
body of law.64 Accordingly, the FTC and other agencies that 
regulate digital privacy are best suited to develop this emerging 
area of law, as discussed at length in the following section. 
A. Federal Regulations of Data-Security and Privacy 
In March 2017, a joint resolution in the House and Senate 
struck down Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
Chairman Tom Wheeler’s regulation to protect Internet users’ 
                                                                                                             
62 Id. 
63 The federal courts are of limited jurisdiction: claims must allege an injury-in-fact, 
causation, and redressability to satisfy the requirements of Article III standing, placing a 
heavy burden on the plaintiff, and thus creating another barrier to streamlining privacy-
related issues related to the IoT. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 
1147–50 (2013) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing because it was highly speculative 
that the government would in fact target plaintiff’s communications, and thus there was 
no injury-in-fact); see also Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 561–62 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(per curiam) (holding that telecom subscribers did not have standing to challenge that the 
government’s bulk data collection program—as authorized under the Patriot Act—
violates the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches because 
plaintiffs could not demonstrate that they were, in fact, targeted for surveillance). But see 
Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629–30 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that a class 
action had Article III standing, where the insured party suffered economic harm through 
having to purchase credit-monitoring services to prevent identity theft and fraud, which 
was not too speculative). 
64 Cf. Andrew Meola, The FAA Rules and Regulations You Need to Know to Keep 
Your Drone Use Legal, BUS. INSIDER (July 25, 2017, 1:12 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/drones-law-faa-regulations-2017-7 [https://perma.cc
/T3CA-YFGR] (providing data indicating that drone regulation across the United States 
is nearing a decade long progression toward a cogent and predictable body of law). 
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personal information.65 The now failed FCC regulation would have 
required Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”)66 to inform consumers 
what information was being collected and how that information 
was being used or shared.67 The repeal’s backers argued that the 
federal regulation would disadvantage ISPs in favor of other data-
collecting companies like Google or Facebook—which the FTC 
oversees.68 The FTC and the FCC are two distinct regulatory 
administrative agencies. Generally, the FTC oversees and approves 
large mergers,69 regulates competition, and ensures consumer 
protection.70 On the other hand, while the FCC regulates similar 
activity, the FCC does not focus on consumer protection.71 The 
FCC is primarily engaged in “promoting competition, innovation 
and investment in broadband services and facilities.”72 Thus, the 
responsibility of online privacy regulation is likely to fall squarely 
on the FTC.73 
                                                                                                             
65 See S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (“That Congress disapproves the rule 
submitted by the Federal Communications Commission relating to ‘Protecting the 
Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services’ (81 Fed. 
Reg. 87,274 (Dec. 2, 2016) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64)), and such rule shall have 
no force or effect.”). 
66 Internet Service Provider (ISP), TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com
/definition/2510/internet-service-provider-isp [https://perma.cc/F84K-XZ8L] (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2017) (“An [ISP] is a company that provides customers with Internet access. 
Data may be transmitted using several technologies, including dial-up, DSL, cable 
modem, wireless or dedicated high-speed interconnects.”). 
67 Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications 
Services, 81 Fed. Reg. at 87,275. 
68 Justin Cosgrove, US Senate Votes to Repeal Internet Privacy Rules, JURIST (Mar. 
24, 2017, 10:32 AM), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2017/03/us-senate-votes-to-
repeal-internet-privacy-rules.php [https://perma.cc/EW9E-NPVN]. 
69 See, e.g., Colin Lecher, The FTC Says It Won’t Stop Amazon from Buying Whole 
Foods, VERGE (Aug. 23, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/23
/16193542/ftc-amazon-whole-foods [https://perma.cc/2LPG-KLQ6] (showing how the 
FTC approved Amazon’s acquisition of Whole Foods). 
70 About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc 
[https://perma.cc/NX5S-ZDAQ] (last visited Oct. 25, 2017). 
71 See What We Do, FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/what-
we-do [https://perma.cc/49WG-KKBG] (last visited Oct. 25, 2017). 
72 Id. 
73 Caleb Chen, Today, Senators Will Vote to Allow ISPs to Sell Your Internet History 
and End FCC Online Privacy Rules, PRIVACY NEWS ONLINE (Mar. 23, 2017), 
https://www.privateinternetaccess.com/blog/2017/03/today-senators-will-vote-allow-isps-
sell-internet-history-end-fcc-online-privacy-rules/ [https://perma.cc/DFU9-9S6Z] (“The 
resolution, if passed . . . would pass the responsibility of online privacy regulation from 
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Still, the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) may be 
the best way to provide consumer relief.74 Generally, the FTC has 
the authority to “gather and compile information concerning, and 
to investigate from time to time the organization, business, 
conduct, practices, and management of any person, partnership, or 
corporation engaged in or whose business affects commerce.”75 
Primarily, the FTC oversees business that affects commerce 
through unfair practices.76 The FTC Act is intended to prevent 
businesses “from using unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.”77 “Unfair” practices are defined as those that 
“cause[] or [are] likely to cause substantial injury to consumers 
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves 
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.”78 Whereas a deceptive practice involves any 
misrepresentation of fact to any portion of the population.79 
Though Federal legislation may regulate privacy matters in the 
IoT, the existing federal regulatory framework is scattered among 
several agencies.80 For example, the Fair Crediting Report Act 
                                                                                                             
the FCC onto the FTC . . . .”); Brian Fung, The House Just Voted to Wipe Away the 
FCC’s Landmark Internet Privacy Protections, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/28/the-house-just-voted-
to-wipe-out-the-fccs-landmark-internet-privacy-protections/?utm_term=.f5675f7787aa 
[https://perma.cc/ADS4-R42G] (stating that one critic discussing the bill remarked that 
“although consumers can easily abandon sites whose privacy practices they don’t agree 
with, it is far more difficult to choose a different Internet provider”). 
74 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby 
declared unlawful.”). 
75 Id. § 46(a). 
76 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 70. 
77 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
78 Id. § 45(n). 
79 See id. § 45(a) (“Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices; 
inapplicability to foreign trade.”). The FTC has defined an unfair practice as, inter alia, a 
deceptive practice or one that “creates a serious consumer injury,” which must be 
substantial, and may include a practice that “does a small harm to a large number of 
people, or if it raises a significant risk of concrete harm.” Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 
949, 1064, 1073 n.12 (1984); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 
246, 251 (6th Cir. 1973). 
80 See generally Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012); 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 
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(“FCRA”) applies to the collection of individual consumer 
information, and oversees the “[a]ccuracy and fairness of credit 
reporting.”81 The FTC Act authorizes the FTC to enforce any 
violations of the FCRA.82 Although certain types of information 
like health and financial data are subject to heightened security 
requirements, there is no set statute that provides general data-
security for back-office and other administrative operations 
involving personal information.83 Accordingly, if an IoT provider 
violates the FCRA then a consumer might have a claim under that 
particular statute that is enforceable through the FTC Act. 
For example, the FTC filed its first IoT related claim against 
TRENDnet in 2013, an IoT company that provided home webcam 
services, for failing to provide sufficient security measures to 
                                                                                                             
(2012); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.). 
81 See FCRA § 1681(a) (“Congress makes the following findings: (1) The banking 
system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting. Inaccurate credit reports 
directly impair the efficiency of the banking system, and unfair credit reporting methods 
undermine the public confidence which is essential to the continued functioning of the 
banking system.”). 
82 The FCRA provides that:  
It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer reporting 
agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of 
commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other 
information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, 
with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper 
utilization of such information in accordance with the requirements 
of this subchapter. 
§ 1681(b). Furthermore, according to the FTC:  
The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent 
persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, savings and loan 
institutions described in section 57a(f)(3) of this title, Federal credit 
unions described in section 57a(f)(4) of this title, common carriers 
subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, air carriers and foreign air 
carriers subject to part A of subtitle VII of title 49, and persons, 
partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce. 
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012). 
83 See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 922 (2006). 
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prevent hackers from intercepting access to its equipment.84 
TRENDnet provided “cameras for consumers to conduct security 
monitoring of their homes or businesses, by accessing live video 
and audio feeds (‘live feeds’) from their [Internet Protocol (‘IP’)] 
cameras over the Internet.”85 The FTC found that TRENDnet 
misrepresented its security measures, and failed to supply 
“reasonable security to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive 
information.”86 Hackers “compromised live feeds display[ing] 
private areas of users’ homes and allowed the unauthorized 
surveillance of infants sleeping in their cribs, young children 
playing, and adults engaging in typical daily activities.”87 The FTC 
relied, in part, on the deception prong of the FTC Act because the 
FTC claimed that TRENDnet violated its own statements made  
to consumers.88 
However, enforcement under the FTC Act for a company’s 
general statements to consumers regarding security is typically 
difficult because it relies on a company “having made overly 
strong security-related promises to the public.”89 Since the security 
breach exposed sensitive information, the FTC determined that 
consumers’ diminished ability to control the dissemination of their 
personal information resulted in significant harm.90 The FTC 
recommended an updated and comprehensive security program, a 
new notice requirement, and a provision requiring TRENDnet to 
provide users with updated software to prevent the harm that the 
company had promised to secure consumers against.91 
                                                                                                             
84 See Complaint at 1–4, TRENDnet, Inc., No. 122-3090, 2013 WL 4858250 (F.T.C. 
Sept. 3, 2013) [hereinafter TRENDnet Complaint]. 
85 Id. at 2. 
86 Id. at 4. “[TRENDnet] described the IP cameras as ‘secure’ or suitable for 
maintaining security, including through . . . a sticker affixed to the cameras’ 
packaging . . . which displays a lock icon and the word ‘security.’” Id. at 3. 
87 Id. at 5. 
88 Id. at 6. 
89 Peppet, supra note 35, at 136. 
90 See TRENDnet Complaint, supra note 84, at 6. 
91 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges 
Against TRENDnet, Inc. (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases
/2014/02/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-against-trendnet-inc [https://perma.cc
/9MSV-95NW] [hereinafter TRENDnet Press Release]. 
2017]   AFTER THE GOLDRUSH 87 
 
Most recently, the FTC filed a complaint against the Taiwan-
based computer networking equipment manufacturer D-Link, 
alleging that the company failed to take reasonable steps to secure 
its wireless routers and IP cameras.92 According to Jessica Rich, 
Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, “[h]ackers 
are increasingly targeting consumer routers and IP cameras—and 
the consequences for consumers can include device compromise 
and exposure of their sensitive personal information.”93 The 
complaint alleged that D-Link hard-coded login credentials into the 
camera software, thereby allowing access to consumers’ live video 
and audio feeds; left users’ login credentials unsecured on its 
mobile apps; and mishandled its own key code, allowing it to be 
public for six months.94 Additionally, D’Link’s “command 
injection flaws . . . allow[ed] remote attackers to gain control of 
consumers’ devices,”95 and was “a known vulnerability that lets 
attackers take control of people’s routers and send them 
unauthorized commands.”96 
However, is FTC regulation over IoT providers trending 
toward deregulation or nonenforcement or deregulation through 
nonenforcement? Is this a distinction without a difference? 
Deregulation at this early stage of moving toward developing a 
cogent body of law that addresses IoT security issues would allow 
the market to dictate expectations rather than lawmakers and the 
courts. Earlier this year, the FTC voted two-to-one to authorize 
filing the complaint against D-Link; however, the acting FTC 
Commissioner, Maureen K. Ohlhausen, voted against the action.97 
                                                                                                             
92 See Complaint at 5, FTC v. D-Link Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00039 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 
2017) [hereinafter D-Link Complaint]. 
93 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges D-Link Put Consumers’ Privacy 
at Risk Due to the Inadequate Security of Its Computer Routers and Cameras (Jan. 5, 
2017) (alteration to original), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/01/ftc
-charges-d-link-put-consumers-privacy-risk-due-inadequate [https://perma.cc/5BJQ-
68GJ] [hereinafter D-Link Press Release]. 
94 D-Link Complaint, supra note 92, at 5. 
95 Id. 
96 Lesley Fair, D-Link Case Alleges Inadequate Internet of Things Security Practices, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan 5, 2017 1:04 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs
/business-blog/2017/01/d-link-case-alleges-inadequate-internet-things-security 
[https://perma.cc/UV9U-AKUE]. 
97 D-Link Press Release, supra note 93. 
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In 2014, the FTC voted unanimously to authorize filing the 
complaint against TRENDnet.98 Recently, Commissioner 
Ohlhausen said that the FTC is “not primarily a regulator[,]” and 
the agency adopted a wait-and-see approach because there had 
been no real harm to consumers, despite the recent holdings in the 
TRENDnet and D-Link cases.99 Although Congress has attempted 
to incentivize technology companies to adopt best practices,100 the 
new trend in federal deregulation might just rewind the clock on 
the federal regulatory progress of IoT-related oversight. 
The FTC has also brought claims against companies under the 
unfairness prong,101 under which the FTC must demonstrate that a 
company’s unfair practice caused or is likely to cause substantial 
harm to consumers.102 With respect to financial and healthcare-
related information, it is clear that the FTC has authority over such 
claims.103 Unlike hidden telephone fees that accumulate and are 
traceable and predictable,104 data security does not provide such a 
salient trail of bread crumbs. Although the FTC has prevailed in 
such actions,105 the FTC’s authority over data security 
requirements is limited, and would benefit from legislative action. 
                                                                                                             
98 TRENDnet Press Release, supra note 91. 
99 Thielman, supra note 55 (noting Ohlhausen also said “We’re saying not ‘Let’s 
speculate about harm five years out,’ but ‘Is there something happening that harms 
consumers right now or is likely to cause harm to consumers’”). 
100 Data Breach Insurance Act, H.R. 6032, 114th Cong. § 45S (2016) (proposing to give 
a fifteen percent tax credit to companies that purchase data breach insurance coverage, 
and adopt the National Institute of Standard and Technology’s voluntary  
cybersecurity framework). 
101 See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2015); LabMD, 
Inc. v. FTC, 776 F.3d 1275, 1277 (11th Cir. 2015); DSW Inc., 141 F.T.C. 117, 120 
(2006); BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 468 (2005). 
102 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
103 See generally Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy: 
Defining Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 809, 829–30 (2011); Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Psychics, Russian 
Roulette, and Data Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 673, 688–89 (2013). 
104 See, e.g., FTC v. Inc21.com Corp., 745 F. Supp. 2d 975, 982 (N.D. Cal. 
2010), aff’d, 475 F. App’x 106 (9th Cir. 2012). 
105 See, e.g., Wyndham Worldwide, 799 F.3d at 245–47 (holding that Wyndham’s 
alleged failure to maintain reasonable and appropriate data security, if proven, could 
constitute an unfair method of competition in commerce). 
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Notably, several European countries are ahead of the 
regulatory curve of IoT oversight. In Germany and Norway, a 
seemingly innocuous blonde-hair blue-eyed doll named “Cayla” 
was banned.106 Cayla is a smart and interactive fashion doll that 
many critics suggest is ripe for a security breach, revealing 
intimate details of its child-users, especially since the “voice 
recordings are stored and used for a variety of purposes beyond 
providing for the toys’ functionality.”107 As the number of devices 
that data is gathered and stored in increases, so does the 
opportunity for a security breach.108 In the United States, however, 
Cayla is free to enter the bedrooms of children whose parents are 
willing to fork over thirty-seven dollars.109 The glaring difference 
between the United States and Germany is that German privacy 
laws are consolidated, while U.S. privacy laws are scattered among 
several agencies.110 And as many of these agencies lose control in 
the oversight of IoT devices,111 consumers will be left vulnerable 
to serious privacy invasions by devices with staggeringly weak 
encryption.112 By consolidating federal regulations and 
establishing minimum standards, IoT developers would have 
clearer guidelines to adhere to before entering the market—similar 
to lawmakers in Germany.113 Ultimately, federal regulatory 
                                                                                                             
106 Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, The Bright-Eyed Talking Doll That Just Might Be a Spy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/technology/cayla-
talking-doll-hackers.html?emc=edit_th_20170219&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid
=58756048&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7QBN-XYL2]. 
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., id. 
109 Genesis, My Friend Cayla Doll ([U.S.] Version), Incl. Mirror & Comb, 18” Tall, 
AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Genesis-Toys-Friend-Interactive-Fashion/dp
/B010T4JV5G [https://perma.cc/7XSA-C4TF] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
110 See Daniel Dimov, Differences Between the Privacy Laws in the EU and the US, 
INFOSEC INST. (Jan. 10, 2013), http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/differences-privacy-
laws-in-eu-and-us/#gref [https://perma.cc/VV4V-VU6C]. 
111 See, e.g., Cosgrove, supra note 68. 
112 See Lucian Constantin, Popular Internet-of-Things Devices Aren’t Secure, 
COMPUTERWORLD (July 30, 2014, 4:22 PM), https://www.computerworld.com/article
/2490587/networking/popular-internet-of-things-devices-aren-t-secure.html 
[https://perma.cc/TTR7-4RKW]. 
113 See Tim Wybitul & Dr. Wolf-Tassilo Bohm, German Parliament Passes New 
Federal Data Protection Act, CHRON. DATA PROTECTION (May 2, 2017), 
http://www.hldataprotection.com/2017/05/articles/consumer-privacy/german-parliament-
passes-new-federal-data-protection-act/ [https://perma.cc/GX29-W6ZZ] (discussing 
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oversight is the best way to address IoT data breaches that threaten 
privacy because it would provide clarity, settle expectations, and 
provide sufficient data security for consumers. 
B. Expanding Data Breach Notifications 
In light of these challenges, the existing federal data-breach 
notification laws should be expanded to include the IoT. According 
to Professor Scott R. Peppet, “a state could simply alter the 
definition of ‘personal information’ in their data-breach statute to 
include name plus biometric or other sensor-based data such as, 
but not necessarily limited to, information from fitness and health 
sensor devices; automobile sensors; home appliance, electricity, 
and other sensors; and smartphone sensors.”114 This approach 
would maintain the current practice “of applying data-breach 
notification statutes only to already-identified datasets . . . that 
include name[s] or other clearly identifying information.”115 This 
practical approach focuses on the type of information that an IoT 
device gathers, and would not interfere with the necessity of IoT 
developers’ pragmatic market-reasons for collecting individual 
data, thereby maintaining individual privacy and  
market efficiency.116 
The policy behind expanding data-breach notification laws to 
include IoT would serve the same purpose as it does for digital 
data. Disclosing IoT data breaches to the public serves a 
“reputational sanction” function, allowing consumers to mitigate 
harm from data breaches.117 This expansion also affords a market 
mechanism to address data security, rather than an administrative 
                                                                                                             
Germany’s privacy laws under their forty-year old Federal Data Protection Act 
(Bundesdatenschutzgesetz—(“BDSG”)), which provides security minimums for 
developers to comply with, along with hefty fines for any violations). 
114 Peppet, supra note 35, at 158. 
115 Id. 
116 See Adam Thierer, Relax and Learn to Love Big Data, U.S. NEWS (Sep. 16, 2013, 
12:10 PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/09/16
/big-data-collection-has-many-benefits-for-internet-users (on file with Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal) (discussing the benefits of big 
data on consumers like “language translation tools, mobile traffic services, digital 
mapping technologies, spam and fraud detection tools, instant spell-checkers,” and 
targeted consumer marketing). 
117 Schwartz & Janger, supra note 83, at 918. 
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mechanism,118 as this approach would provide a check on IoT 
device manufacturers.119 Companies, developers, and corporate 
counsel have all shown that they take the reputational 
consequences of data-breach notification seriously because it 
affects their products.120 For example, California has already 
issued general guidance on Internet data, as discussed in the 
following section.121 Thus, legislators would need to specifically 
define personal information with respect to IoT devices’ data-
collecting capabilities. Nevertheless, the states should enact 
legislation to fill in the federal gaps. 
C. After the Gold Rush: California on the IoT Data-Security  
and Privacy 
The federal government’s scattered sectoral approach to digital 
privacy issues has forced many states to address growing digital 
privacy issues, thus creating a patchwork of uncertainty.122 In New 
York, legislators have adopted potent measures to ensure that 
financial companies protect consumer data.123 However, California 
is one of forty-six states to enact data-breach notification laws,124 
                                                                                                             
118 Compare Mark Burdon, Contextualizing the Tensions and Weaknesses of 
Information Privacy and Data Breach Notification Laws, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 66 (2011) (noting that data-protection laws help mitigate market 
tensions between “consumer protection and corporate compliance cost minimization”), 
with Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1545 
(2013) (identifying an administrative law approach to data security). See generally Calo, 
supra note 50 (discussing the concept of “market manipulation”). 
119 See Burdon, supra note 118, at 66. 
120 See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the 
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 275 (2010) (“[E]very single respondent mentioned . . . the 
enactment of state data breach notification statutes[] as an important driver of privacy in 
corporations.” (citation omitted)). 
121 See generally OFFICE OF PRIVACY PROT., CAL. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, 
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES ON NOTICE OF SECURITY BREACH INVOLVING PERSONAL 
INFORMATION 8–14 (2007). 
122 See Charlotte A. Tschider, Experimenting with Privacy: Driving Efficiency Through 
a State-Informed Federal Data Breach Notification and Data Protection Law, 18 TUL. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 45, 52 (2015). 
123 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500 (2017) (noting the need to establish 
regulatory minimum standards in order to resolve cybersecurity issues in the financial 
services industry). 
124 ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-545 (West, Westlaw 
through 2017 1st Reg. Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (2017); CAL. CIV. CODE 
§§ 1798.29, 1798.82 (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (West 2016); CONN. GEN. 
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not to mention a myriad of privacy regulations.125 The California 
statute provides: 
Any agency that maintains computerized data that 
includes personal information that the agency does 
                                                                                                             
STAT. § 36a-701b (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 
§ 12B-102 (2005), amended by Act of Aug. 17, 2017, ch. 129, sec. 1, § 12B-102, 81 Del. 
Laws (effective Apr. 14, 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568 (Westlaw through 2017 1st 
Reg. Sess. & 25th Leg., Spec. “A” Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-912 (2017); HAW. REV. 
STAT. §§ 487N-1–487N-7 (Westlaw through 2017 1st Spec. Sess.); IDAHO CODE.  
§ 28-51-105 (2017); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/10–530/12 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 
100-535); IND. CODE §§ 24-4.9-3-1–24-4.9-3-2 (2017); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 715C.2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a02 (2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:3074 (2005) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2006), http://legis.la.gov/legis/Law.aspx?d=322030 [https://perma.cc
/AEH4-K8LT]; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, § 1348 (2017); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW. 
§§ 14-3501–14-3508 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.), amended by Personal 
Protection Act, ch. 518, sec. 1, §§ 14-501–508, 2017 Md. Laws 2755, 3080–89 (2017) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, §§ 1–6 (West, Westlaw 
through 2017 1st Ann. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 (2017); MINN. STAT. 
§ 325E.61 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-29 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 
(2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-803 (2017); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.220 (West, Westlaw through 79th Legis. Sess.); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 359-C:20 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 56:8-163 (West, Westlaw through L.2017); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (McKinney, 
Westlaw through Leg. 2017, ch. 1–402); N.C. GEN. STAT ANN. § 75-65 (2017); N.D. 
CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 51-30-02–51-30-03 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess. of the 65th 
Legis. Assemb.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.12, 1349.19 (Westlaw through 2017 
File 23 of the 132nd Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018) & 2017 State Issue 1); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 74, § 3113.1 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.604 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) 
(effective through Oct. 6, 2017); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301–2308, 2329 (2005); 11 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 11-49.3-4 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 47-18-2107 (2017); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.053 (West 2015); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 13-44-202 (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435 (2017), http://legislature
.vermont.gov/statutes/section/09/062/02435 [https://perma.cc/845D-869N]; VA. CODE 
ANN. § 18.2–186.6 (2017); id. § 32.1–127.1:05 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010 
(2017); id. § 42.56.590 (2017); W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-2A-101–46A-2A-105 (West, 
Westlaw through 2017 2d Extraordinary); WIS. STAT. § 134.98 (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40-12-502 (2017). 
125 See Online Privacy Protection Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West 
2017); Digital Privacy Rights for Minors, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22580–22582 
(Deering 2017); Student Online Personal Information Protection Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE §§ 22584–22585 (West 2017); Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware 
Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22947–22947.6 (West 2017); Medical Apps Act, CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 56.06 (West 2014), amended by Act of Oct. 7, 2017, ch. 561, sec. 17, 
§ 56.06, 27, 2017 Cal. Leg. Serv. 1, 27–28 (West); Cyber Exploitation Act, CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1708.85 (2014), amended by Act of Sept. 11, 2017, ch. 233, sec. 1, § 1708.85(f), 
2017 Cal. Leg. Serv. 1, 2–4 (West) & CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 502.–502.01, 647(j), 647.8, 
786 (West 2017); CAL. GOV. CODE § 11015.5 (West 2017). 
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not own shall notify the owner or licensee of the 
information of any breach of the security of the data 
immediately following discovery, if the personal 
information was, or is reasonably believed to have 
been, acquired by an unauthorized person.126 
Personal information has either of two meanings. First, it 
means an individual’s first name or first initial and last name, in 
combination with any of the following data elements: social 
security number, driver’s license number, financial account 
number, medical information, or health insurance information.127 
Second, it means a username or e-mail address, in combination 
with a password or security question and answer that would permit 
online access of information.128 However, personal information 
does not include “publicly available information that is lawfully 
made available to the general public from federal, state, or local 
government records.”129 
Defining and identifying data as personal or public is a start. 
For example, consider fitness and health related data: This likely 
qualifies as personal information, and is therefore protected under 
California statute, in part, because it is not publicly available.130 As 
Professor Peppet suggested,131 perhaps all of the data collected by 
IoT devices could be considered data that is related to health and 
fitness under the California statutory scheme.132 For example, 
teakettles, pillboxes, and HVAC systems all implicate an 
individual’s health-related habits, since they demonstrate the user’s 
dietary habits, medical issues, and environmental surroundings.133 
Notwithstanding smart city devices and industrial devices, 
                                                                                                             
126 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(b) (emphasis added). 
127 Id. § 1798.81.5(d)(1)(A). 
128 Id. § 1798.81.5(d)(1)(B). 
129 Id. § 1798.81.5(d)(4). 
130 See Peppet, supra note 35, at 139. 
131 See id. at 158. 
132 See id. With the exclusion of IoT devices such as bridge sensors, and other devices 
that do not monitor an individual’s behavior. 
133 Cf. Sam Thielman & Elle Hunt, Cyber Attack: Hackers ‘Weaponised’ Everyday 
Devices with Malware, GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2016, 1:47 AM), https://www.theguardian
.com/technology/2016/oct/22/cyber-attack-hackers-weaponised-everyday-devices-with-
malware-to-mount-assault [https://perma.cc/4QGY-PNR9] (discussing the sensitive 
information stored in everyday items such as teakettles). 
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personally identifiable IoT devices within the home likely provide 
insight into an individual user’s health-related information.134 
Thus, defining IoT devices that encompass such broad health-
related information—which is already protected under existing 
statutes—may provide legislators with the means to include more 
stringent protection for IoT data, and ultimately, the privacy of  
its users. 
Furthermore, the California Online Privacy Protection Act 
(“CalOPPA”) provides, in part, that website operators could be 
subject to legal action for failing to meet the standards outlined in 
the Act, which determine how a website operator must post their 
privacy policies.135 CalOPPA was recently amended to require that 
privacy policies also identify the categories of personally 
identifiable information collected, and with what third parties that 
information will be shared.136 Much like the FTC, CalOPPA is 
enforced by a separate Act known as the Business and Professions 
Code section 17200,137 which provides the same causes of action 
as the FTC Act under either an unlawful or unfair prong.138 
California also provides similar guidance material on privacy 
notifications for emerging technology providers, although it is  
not enforceable.139 
                                                                                                             
134 See, e.g., Marc Ambasna-Jones, The Smart Home and a Data Underclass, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2016, 10:26 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media-network
/2015/aug/03/smart-home-data-underclass-internet-of-things [https://perma.cc/GU9X-
EXSR] (discussing the benefits and perils of insurance companies gathering personal 
home data, and providing discounts or higher premiums depending on domestic habits). 
135 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West 2017). 
136 See A.B. 370, 2013 (Cal. 2013). 
137 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2017); id. §§ 22575–22579; CARTLON A. 
VARNER & THOMAS D. NEVINS, CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 1–2 
(3d ed. 2003) (noting that the California Supreme Court recognized section 17200 as the 
“little FTC Act”). 
138 See BUS. & PROF. § 17200 (“[U]nfair competition shall mean and 
include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, 
untrue or misleading advertising . . . .”). 
139 See generally, e.g., KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MAKING YOUR 
PRIVACY PRACTICES PUBLIC: RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEVELOPING A MEANINGFUL 
PRIVACY POLICY (2014), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecurity
/making_your_privacy_practices_public.pdf [https://perma.cc/73J9-GT5D] (including 
guidelines on how to “[m]ake it easy for a consumer to find the section in which you 
describe your policy regarding online tracking by labeling it”). 
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Despite California’s innovative strides toward regulating 
emerging technologies, it is still not prepared for the emerging 
privacy and security risks associated with the IoT. For example, 
IoT devices may not necessarily come shipped with privacy 
policies directly attached to the devices.140 Additionally, IoT 
developers are rushing devices to the market, which are poorly 
equipped to provide adequate security.141 Consumers will not be 
able to familiarize themselves with the device’s privacy policies, or 
know if IoT providers are sharing their personal information and 
with whom, let alone enforce their purported privacy rights. 
However, this may be changing. While CalOPPA may fail to 
keep pace with the IoT, California legislators are making strides to 
address the security issues that the IoT presents. Introduced by 
California Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, Senate Bill 327 would 
require manufacturers selling connected devices to be equipped 
with “reasonable security features appropriate to the nature of the 
device and the information it may collect . . . that protect the 
device and any information contained therein from unauthorized 
access.”142 Further, the bill would require that manufacturers notify 
consumers of “whether [a device] is capable of collecting audio, 
video, location, biometric, health, or other personal or sensitive 
user information if . . . not otherwise indicated by the 
                                                                                                             
140 See, e.g., Bernard Marr, What Is the Internet of Things—A Complete Beginner’s 
Guide in 2017, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2017, 8:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/bernardmarr/2017/04/10/what-is-the-internet-of-things-a-complete-beginners-guide-in-
2017/#5ca75fc25982 [https://perma.cc/KU7K-76BK] (characterizing the Amazon Echo 
as an IoT device); Alexa Terms of Use, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help
/customer/display.html?nodeId=201809740 [https://perma.cc/36KU-DNR6] (last updated 
Oct. 24, 2017) (providing terms of use and privacy policy on Amazon’s website and not 
on the actual device); see also Jonathon Hauenschild, Lawmakers Must Clarify Privacy 
Protections for the Internet of Things, HILL (Jan. 6, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://thehill.com
/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/312968-lawmakers-must-clarify-privacy-protections-for-
the-internet-of [https://perma.cc/33LL-QCDB]. 
141 See Gareth Corfield, Fix Crap Internet of Things Security, Booms Internet Daddy 
Cerf, REGISTER (Mar. 21, 2017, 2:36 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/21/vint
_cerf_internet_things_security/ [https://perma.cc/DB38-MTGD] (“The biggest worry 
[Vint Cerf has] is that people building [IoT] devices will grab a piece of open source 
software or operating system and just jam it into the device and send it out into the wild 
without giving adequate thought and effort to securing the system and providing 
convenient user access to those devices.”). 
142 S.B. 327, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
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packaging . . . .”143 It would also require manufacturers to “obtain 
consumer consent before it collects or transmits information 
beyond what is necessary in order to fulfill a user transaction or 
for the stated functionality of the connected device . . . .”144 
In fact, California Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson used Cayla—
the same cute little doll that drew the ire of German policy-
makers—as an example of why this piece of legislation is so 
important.145 While the bill provides precisely the types of security 
measures that would secure consumer data with respect to IoT 
devices, at the moment, the California Senate cannot seem to push 
it through.146 Many privacy-interest and public-interest groups 
support the bill, including the Electronic Frontier Foundation,147 
while its opponents—including the California Chamber of 
Commerce—spent over ten million dollars lobbying against the 
bill.148 Ultimately, it was short on votes and will likely face further 
revision—possibly even removing its most important 
safeguards.149 Nevertheless, Part III discusses recent examples of 
why it might be necessary for California to push forward on Senate 
Bill 327 to move toward securing IoT devices, and provide a 
model for other states and perhaps even federal regulations. 
III. SECURITY BREACHES AND INVASIONS OF PRIVACY  
IN THE IOT 
It is happening again. The rise of IoT malware is reminiscent of 
the viruses, worms, and e-mail spam that crippled early Internet 
users, because most personal computers were not adequately 
secured, and companies that rushed to enter the market ignored or 
                                                                                                             
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 See Dan Morain, This Cute Doll Can Spy on Your Kid. Why Doesn’t the Legislature 
Seem to Care?, SACRAMENTO BEE (June 9, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.sacbee.com
/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/dan-morain/article155217209.html [https://perma.cc/7MSF-
72E9]; see also supra Section II.A. 
146 See Morain, supra note 145. 
147 See id.; see also S.B. 327, Reg. Sess. 
148 See Morain, supra note 145. 
149 See id. 
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did not understand the need for Internet security.150 The same is 
true now for the IoT. This Part argues that IoT devices have, in 
fact, harmed consumers, and that merely permitting IoT developers 
to oversee and develop their own best practices will leave users 
vulnerable to dangerous IoT attacks and privacy breaches. 
Several scholars have urged lawmakers to permit the IoT to 
develop with relatively little oversight.151 However, the TRENDnet 
and D-Link cases notwithstanding, the IoT has profoundly 
impacted individual privacy in other areas besides live-stream 
interception.152 For example, an Ohio man was arrested and 
convicted of arson after the police examined his heart monitor’s 
recorded data.153 A cardiologist reviewed the data that the police 
retrieved from the man’s heart monitor, and concluded that he 
could not have been in the home during the fire, which was 
contrary to the Ohio man’s initial statements to the police.154 The 
cardiologist said that it was “‘highly improbable’ that a person 
with [his] medical condition could collect and remove the items in 
such a short period of time.”155 Although this data is retrievable 
under other legal theories in cases of criminal investigations, this 
case illustrates the highly intrusive nature of IoT devices and their 
effect on the legal landscape. 
Furthermore, the IoT is vulnerable to security breaches.156 
Consider the Ohio man with the IoT heart monitor. Perhaps the 
data that IoT providers monitor, store, and stream is unsecure like 
the live-streams in TRENDnet. Such unfettered access to personal 
and private information is not only offensive, it is also potentially 
                                                                                                             
150 Lily Hay Newman, The Botnet That Broke the Internet Isn’t Going Away, WIRED 
(Dec. 9, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/botnet-broke-internet-isnt-
going-away/ [https://perma.cc/3VZW-WFYG]. 
151 See, e.g., Thierer, supra note 59, at 118 (discussing the negative impact that 
regulation would have on innovation). 
152 Debra Cassens Weiss, Data on Man’s Pacemaker Led to His Arrest on Arson 
Charges, ABA J. (Feb. 6, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/data
_on_mans_pacemaker_led_to_his_arrest_on_arson_charges/?utm_source=maestro&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email [https://perma.cc/73HL-C894]. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 See generally Julie Brill, The Internet of Things: Building Trust and Maximizing 
Benefits Through Consumer Control, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 205, 210–12 (2014). 
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physically dangerous. Suppose a hacker was able to intercept the 
data streaming from the man’s heart monitor and interpret it to 
track patterns associated with his heart rate. The hacker now has 
the ability to track the man’s physical presence and state at any 
given moment—for example, the hacker could determine if the 
man was asleep or out for a jog—and potentially perpetrate a 
physical crime. Thus, as the IoT links the Internet back into the 
physical world, IoT hacks can and will have physical implications. 
What seems clear is that a single vulnerable IoT device opens 
up a number of vulnerabilities in all other IoT devices connected 
through the same network.157 In particular, most IoT devices are, 
and will continue to be, connected through home Wi-Fi networks, 
which are easy to breach.158 So if one device connected to your 
home network is inadequately protected, a hacker could use that 
device to breach your entire network, and thereby compromise 
other IoT devices and non-IoT devices connected to the same 
network, like laptops and cellphones.159 Furthermore, consumers 
connect their IoT devices through their home routers, which are 
notoriously unprotected160 and pose a serious security risk.161 
Many existing devices and new IoT devices have minimal 
                                                                                                             
157 See Atzori et al., supra note 19, at 2787 (“The basic idea of this concept is the 
pervasive presence around us of a variety of things or objects—such as . . . [RFID] tags, 
sensors, actuators, mobile phones, etc.—which, through unique addressing schemes, are 
able to interact with each other and cooperate with their neighbors to reach  
common goals.”). 
158 See Verizon Launches National IoT Network, YAHOO FIN. (Apr. 3, 2017), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/verizon-launches-national-iot-network-162100012.html 
[https://perma.cc/HYL9-JM4U] (noting that IoT devices will be linked predominantly  
by Wi-Fi). 
159 See Dan Goodin, [Twelve] Million Home and Business Routers Vulnerable to 
Critical Hijacking Hack, ARSTECHNICA (Dec. 18, 2014), https://arstechnica.com
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critical-hijacking-hack/ [https://perma.cc/24LU-MZH5]. See generally Pageler, supra 
note 39. 
160 See Dan Goodin, supra note 159; Brian Krebs, Lizard Stresser Runs on Hacked 
Home Routers, KREBS ON SECURITY (Jan. 15, 2015), http://krebsonsecurity.com
/2015/01/lizard-stresser-runs-on-hacked-home-routers/ [https://perma.cc/8WEC-EVMQ]. 
161 See Bruce Schneier, Security Risks of Embedded Systems, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY 
(Jan. 9, 2014, 6:33 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/01/security_risks
_9.html [https://perma.cc/3SH8-YLGG] (“[H]undreds of millions of devices that have 
been sitting on the Internet, unpatched and insecure, for the last five to ten years . . . . We 
have an incipient disaster in front of us. It’s just a matter of when.”). 
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protection against security breaches.162 Accordingly, IoT devices 
connected through home routers are low-hanging fruit  
for hackers.163 
The recent large-scale DDoS attacks on IoT devices may be a 
harbinger of even more widespread attacks to come, at the 
frontlines of which are Bots.164 Bots can steal data, send spam, and 
intercept devices, all of which gum-up a network to slow it down, 
while holding the server hostage and gaining sensitive user-data.165 
There are several types of Bots, but this Article focuses on a very 
recent and pugnacious manifestation employed to disable IoT 
devices: “Mirai.”166 
In September and October 2016, DDoS attacks on several IoT 
devices used the infamous Mirai botnet.167 Daniel Miessler, 
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SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (Feb. 20, 2016), https://securityintelligence.com/thingbots-the-
future-of-botnets-in-the-internet-of-things/ [https://perma.cc/MJ7P-X853]. 
166 See generally Tony Bradley, How Amazon Echo Users Can Control Privacy, 
FORBES (Jan. 5, 2017, 12:12PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonybradley/2017/01
/05/alexa-is-listening-but-amazon-values-privacy-and-gives-you-control/#59268c327ee6 
[https://perma.cc/8B2R-AGAJ] (“‘Privacy and security of IoT is big right now following 
recent attacks like the Mirai botnet and malware targeting specific brands of smart TVs,’ 
declared Cris Thomas, a respected security expert and spokesperson for Tenable  
Network Security.”). 
167 See Chris Williams, Today the Web Was Broken by Countless Hacked Devices – 
Your [Sixty]-Second Summary, REGISTER (Oct. 21, 2016, 9:45 PM), 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/10/21/dyn_dns_ddos_explained/ [https://perma.cc
/DRU8-XBKK] (“Mirai spreads across the web, growing its ranks of obeying zombies, 
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Director of Advisory Services at IOActive commented, “The 
current state of IoT security is in bad shape, and will get a whole 
lot worse before it gets any better. The Mirai botnet, which is 
powered by 100,000 IoT devices that are insecure by default, is 
just the most obvious and topical example.”168 The Mirai botnet is 
incredibly pernicious—it is difficult to contain since it lurks on IoT 
devices, and generally does not noticeably affect devices’ 
performance.169 Unlike early IoT-like devices, the IoT runs on 
traditional IPs, which are notoriously vulnerable to attack.170 Even 
assuming the average IoT device user realized that something was 
wrong, users have “no direct way to interface with the infected 
product.”171 The average consumer does not know how to 
troubleshoot—let alone fix—any potentially compromised devices. 
Several copycat DDoS attacks have sprung from the Mirai 
botnet attack.172 The BrickerBot penetrates IoT devices and then 
spreads to non-IoT devices, thus infecting an entire network of 
devices and programs connected to the breached IoT device.173 
Additionally, the Amnesia botnet “exploits . . . remote code 
execution vulnerability by scanning for, locating, and attacking 
vulnerable systems.”174 What these DDoS attacks highlight is that 
the IoT devices entering the market must come with adequate 
security protocols.175 Accordingly, federal regulation that imposes 
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stricter guidelines on IoT developers before entering the market 
would prevent future attacks.176 
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR DATA-SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN THE IOT 
If the FTC is trending toward deregulating the IoT and IoT 
purveyors are left to oversee themselves, then security and privacy 
will surely remain vulnerable. Perhaps the only sure-fire way to 
ensure the security of IoT devices and consumer privacy is to do it 
yourself. This Part argues that businesses would benefit from a 
self-imposed privacy-by-design scheme. Additionally, consumers 
should rely on self-help methods to ensure their privacy and 
security while also urging manufacturers to continue to utilize 
established best practices. However, self-help measures could 
negatively impact federal regulation of the IoT. 
A. Privacy-by-Design in the IoT 
The European Parliament and Council of Ministers has already 
been working to incentivize companies to incorporate security 
safeguards by-design177 in order to protect user privacy.178 
Whereas the FTC: 
[S]uggests companies follow a ‘defen[s]e in depth’ 
approach, considering security measures at several 
different points in their systems, such as using 
access control measures and encrypting data even 
when users are making use of encrypted links to 
home Wi-Fi routers (which will not protect the data 
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between the router and the company’s servers, or if 
the router is badly configured).179 
In the United States, several companies have rolled out services 
that have proven to be vulnerable to hacking and attacks.180 By 
incorporating a by-design approach, companies would have to 
rigorously test their services and products in order to enter the 
market.181 For example, when a new product enters the market, 
developers adhere to physical safety standards like seatbelts or 
blade guards. Similarly, a tech company would adhere to privacy 
safety standards when creating and designing a new device or 
application. Although this approach may cost companies time and 
money in developing a more secure service or product, it would 
prevent serious privacy intrusion, and would ultimately benefit the 
company by providing greater security against liability. Most 
importantly, it would provide consumers with a choice of which 
products and services to purchase with their privacy in mind. 
The biggest boost in IoT security could come from simply 
providing a stronger data encryption for devices right out of the 
box. Data encryption is essentially a form of security that depends 
on what is being protected.182 With respect to IoT, sensitive user 
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data needs to be protected. Similar to the existing data-
encryption183 shielding personal information from the public, the 
IoT must rely on—at a minimum—what consumers have come to 
expect from their non-IoT devices—such as cellphones and 
laptops—to provide a basic level of security through encryption. 
However, many of the IoT devices that enter the market are not 
equipped with what consumers have come to expect as a basic 
level of cyber security.184 
IoT developers should only be permitted to enter the market 
after proving up adequate security measures because default device 
encryption leaves IoT devices exposed to security breaches.185 
Although the costs of creating and maintaining adequate security 
will likely increase the prices of IoT devices entering the 
market,186 the gains in security should be touted as a marketable 
benefit to the consumer—a benefit that, in light of recent DDoS 
attacks, should be just as important as the underlying service that a 
particular IoT device provides. Accordingly, both IoT developers 
and IoT users would benefit from clear design standards to ensure 
an IoT device’s security. But if the market lags in dictating the 
security measures that IoT developers take before entering the 
market, perhaps consumers should take their data security and 
privacy concerns into their own hands. 
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B. Self-Help: Blockchain Technology 
There is a promising data security technology on the horizon. 
Blockchain technology (“BT”) is a relatively new method of data 
encryption that has only been applied in financial technology.187 
Canadian programmer Vitalik Buterin describes BT as 
“decentrali[z]ed autonomous organi[z]ations” that are sets of rules 
for users to abide by,188 and envisions BT allowing IoT devices to 
bypass registration and tracking.189 BT is considered by many 
technology professionals and analysts to be the missing link to 
ensure data privacy.190 BT essentially provides IoT providers with 
a lock and key to data.191 BT can be used to track billions of IoT 
devices, and process and coordinate between devices by 
decentralizing the data.192 Decentralization, along with stronger 
encryption, would provide stronger data security, thereby 
providing IoT users with more privacy.193 There are companies 
cropping up all over the world that are developing BT’s application 
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to IoT devices.194 Most famously, BT was part of the driving 
technology that made Bitcoin so secure.195 IBM, Microsoft, and 
many other service providers are also developing BT.196 In a recent 
report, IBM suggested that attempting to monitor billions of IoT 
devices centrally would make them vulnerable to hacking and 
government surveillance.197 
BT would also help to protect IoT devices from hackers and 
DDoS attacks. Business and technology expert Ahmed Banafa 
argues that there is an “urgent need for a secure IoT model to 
perform common tasks such as sensing, processing, storage, and 
communicating.”198 He argues that BT’s edge is that it is public, 
and that everyone participating can see the blocks and any 
transactions stored inside of the block.199 Although public, only 
those users with a private key may access their own blocks.200 
Since BT decentralizes all of the data, “there is no single authority 
that can approve transactions or set specific rules to have 
transactions accepted.”201 Although this decentralized data concept 
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is based on trust among its users, it is touted as the most secure 
response to privacy concerns for IoT devices.202 
To be sure, BT is not without its flaws. Developers have raised 
concerns with scalability issues, processing power and time, 
storage, and legal and compliance issues that might scare off new 
businesses from integrating BT into their IoT devices.203 At 
present, such diverse types of IoT devices would make it difficult 
to streamline BT.204 Since BT is decentralized, the blocks would 
have to be housed in each individual IoT device; however, the 
sensors for most IoT devices are too small and do not have enough 
processing power.205 Additionally, many—if not most—consumers 
may not have financial or informational access to such technology 
to ensure their data privacy. Nevertheless, BT provides the most 
promising prospect of securing data and promoting privacy  
in the IoT. 
C. Self-Help Could Negatively Impact Potential Regulation 
Consumer-wide self-help might run the risk of negatively 
impacting the policy that shapes eventual IoT regulation.206 
Although imperfect, BT could privatize and decentralize data-
security.207 Self-help measures like BT might run the risk of 
loosening the expectations of IoT developers to provide safe and 
secure IoT devices. Effectively, BT could provide enough security 
that legislators may not need to regulate the IoT. Self-help should 
remain a solution for consumers to combat the risks of data-
security affecting privacy in an unregulated IoT world, without 
shifting entirely the burden from IoT developers to the consumer. 
But the complexity of the data-security and privacy issues from the 
IoT may prove unpredictable for self-help measures like BT. 
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Furthermore, BT is user-based and still susceptible to hacks. 
Less than a year ago, Bitcoin was hacked for sixty-five million 
dollars.208 While BT could provide strong encryption methods for 
IoT users, a modicum of oversight would still be necessary to 
address the data-security and privacy issues raised by IoT devices. 
In order to secure IoT devices and promote digital privacy, FTC 
regulations should include strict IoT developer oversight, and a 
more expanded definition of personal information, to promote 
effective data-breach notifications. This would not only promote 
digital privacy, but it would also provide a minimum expectation 
of individual privacy protection to IoT consumers. Accordingly, 
even with effective self-help methods like BT soon to be available 
to consumers, it may all be for naught unless regulators step in to 
provide meaningful guidance. 
CONCLUSION 
 While the benefits of the developing IoT and its related 
technology provide a boon for users and the economy, it also 
provides pitfalls and potential legal challenges. As this technology 
develops and impacts daily life, it will be imperative to 
consciously and carefully develop the law alongside it. First, IoT 
developers should employ a privacy-by-design approach to their 
IoT devices before entering the market, which would benefit both 
developers and consumers. Second, perhaps California—among 
other states—might lead the way to a workable regulatory 
framework to ensure consumer data-security and privacy. With 
enough success, perhaps federal regulations will follow states like 
California, and streamline expectations for IoT developers and 
users. Finally, despite the potential impact to federal regulations of 
the IoT, consumers should protect their own data and privacy 
interests through available self-help measures, like BT. Thus, even 
though federal and state regulatory oversight would be ideal, until 
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then, consumers and service providers could utilize self-help 
methods like BT. 
